The false/ recovered memory debate has highlighted the complexities involved in assessing the
validity of memories for emotional childhood events. This dissertation begins by tracing the history
of the dominant school of thought on memory, the spatial perspective, as well as far less
conspicuous reconstructive views, and challenges influential modern spatial views (e.g., repression) in
light of a more defensible reconstructive model. The empirical component of this dissertation was
designed to compare the nature of real, created, and fabricated childhood memories for emotional
events within individuals. The critical issues being addressed in the experiment were: (1) whether
people could come to remember false ("created") memories for emotional events; (2) if so, whether
differences existed between created memories and real and/or intentionally lied about (fabricated)
memories, and; (3) whether there were individual differences in susceptibility to created memories.
Using a variation of an approach developed by Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995), a
questionnaire was forwarded to participants' parents inquiring about six categories of negative
emotional events (serious medical procedure, serious animal attack, getting seriously hurt by another child, serious
indoor accident, serious outdoor accident, and getting lost) which the participant may or may not have
experienced between the ages of 4 and 10 years. Parents were asked to describe each event which
had occurred and to give a number of specific pieces of information relating to the event. Based on
the questionnaire information (85% response rate), 77 participants were interviewed about each of a:
(1) real event; (2) false event; and (3) fabricated event, in three weekly-spaced interviews. Over the
three interviews, the interviewers attempted to implant a created memory for the false emotional
event using encouragement, context reinstatement, guided imagery, and instructing daily recall
attempts. In the first interview, participant were asked about the real event and the false event
(counterbalanced), each introduced as a true event. They were provided the event tide and four
specific pieces of information to cue their memories (their age, location, season/ month, and people
present), based on questionnaire information (contrived for the false events). In the second
interview, participants were re-interviewed about their memories for the false event followed by the
implantation procedure. In the third interview, participants were again interviewed about the false
event with the same interview approach. Finally (after the last attempt at recalling the false event),
they were provided written instructions to fabricate a childhood memory, again with an event
category and four information clues, given preparation rime and a monetary incentive, and
interviewed about the fabricated event with the same format as the other two memory types.
Following transcription of the two or three (if a created memory had emerged) final memory
reports, the memories were compared on several dependent measures, collectively designated the
Memory Assessment Procedure (MAP), relating to their subjective and presentation characteristics.
Participants were then asked to complete a Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) questionnaire to
examine if susceptibility to created memories was related to a general dissociative cognitive pattern.
Results indicated that twenty (26%) of participants created complete memories for the false
emotional events (seven animal attacks, five instances of getting seriously hurt by another child, four
serious outdoor accidents, three episodes of getting lost, and one medical procedure). Furthermore,
29.9% of participants reported some false information pertaining to the false event ("partial"
memories), for a total of 55.9% of participants recalling information relating to the false event. The
remaining participants (44.2%) reported no information pertaining to the false event. There were
several interesting differences among the three memory types, including stress ratings, vividness/
clarity ratings, confidence ratings, coherence, number of details, repeated details, and memory
failures. For example, when relating a created memory, participants were less confident and the
memories were less vivid and detailed compared to the other memory types, but similar in sensory
components and relevancy. On the other hand, participants were highly confident in their
fabricated memories which were rated as highly stressful and vivid, and the memories were detailed.
However, when relating a fabricated memory, participants repeated details and were less willing to
admit lacking memory, relative to real memories. Other findings are reported on the origin of the
created memories, age factors, memory perspective, reasons provided for first forgetting the false
event, and post-interview confidence in the created memories. On the DES , participants who had
come up with a partial or a created memory scored, on average, about twice as high as those
participants who had recalled no false information, indicating that susceptibility to memory
distortion may be related to a general dissociative pattern.
This was the largest scale created memory study to date and the first to look at a variety of
emotional childhood events and the content of the memories. Implications of the findings for the
false memory debate and memory assessment in forensic contexts are discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/9568 |
| Date | 11 1900 |
| Creators | Porter, Stephen |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Format | 16285135 bytes, application/pdf |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
Page generated in 0.2861 seconds