Debt holding by managers, i.e., inside debt, aligns the incentives of managers more closely with those of debtholders, reducing agency costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011)). My thesis investigates the effect of managerial ownership of debt on corporate risk-taking, bank loan contracting, and accounting conservatism. / In the first chapter I examine the effect of managerial ownership of debt on agency costs of debt problems related to risk-taking. I find that higher managerial ownership of debt implements lower corporate risk-taking, in terms of less investment in R&D, more investment in capital expenditures, and more corporate diversification. The role of inside debt in moderating risk-taking is more pronounced in firms with high level of default risk. These findings suggest that managers with large inside debt holdings are less likely to pursue risky projects that potentially transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders. / In the second chapter I examine how terms of bank loans are related to managerial ownership of debt. Specifically, the analysis uncovers significant evidence of lower loan spreads for firms with larger debt ownership by CEOs. The negative relation is more pronounced when creditors face higher expropriation risk and when the CEO's expected retirement horizon is beyond loan maturity. I also find that loans to firms with larger managerial debt holdings are associated with smaller lending syndicates, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral requirement, consistent with lenders anticipating lower expropriation risk at these firms. / In the third chapter I examine the relation between accounting conservatism and managerial ownership of debt. Consistent with debt holdings by managers mitigating the debtholder-shareholder conflicts and reducing debtholders' demand for accounting conservatism, I find significant evidence of less conservative financial reporting at firms whose CEOs have accumulated more deferred compensation and pension benefits. This negative relation is more pronounced in firms with higher expected agency costs of debt and in firms that can credibly commit to a higher level of conservatism if required by debtholders. These findings are robust to using a number of alternative accounting conservatism measures and to correcting for potential endogeneity of managerial ownership of debt. / Xin, Xiangang. / Advisers: Danqing Young; Oliver M. Rui; Cong Wang. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-07(E), Section: A. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 134-140). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_344961 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Contributors | Xin, Xiangang., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Business Administration. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, theses |
| Format | electronic resource, microform, microfiche, 1 online resource (viii, 140 leaves : ill.) |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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