Many contemporary philosophers are committed – either implicitly or explicitly – to Propositionalism about thought-experimental intuitions. According to this view, thought-experimental intuitions are (1) phenomenally conscious, (2) spontaneous, (3) and non-theoretical; most importantly, Propositionalists claim that intuitions (4) bear consciously accessible propositional content. The negative project of this essay is a critique of (4), the rejection of which is tantamount to rejecting Propositionalism. In addition, I propose an alternative position – namely, Interpretationalism. According to Interpretationalism, intuitions possess the features ascribed in (1)-(3); however, they do not bear consciously accessible propositional content. Instead, intuitions acquire cognitive significance by virtue of being interpreted in light of a subject’s background beliefs.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:scholarworks.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1194 |
Date | 12 August 2016 |
Creators | McGahhey, Marcus |
Publisher | ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University |
Source Sets | Georgia State University |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Philosophy Theses |
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