The thesis deals with relation between central bank independence and accountability. The relation is examined on example of quantitative easing implemented in the period 2005 - 2016 by the European central bank and the Federal Reserve System. From the theoretical and practical point of view the thesis proves that the relation between central bank independence and accountability are influenced by the specification of targets of monetary policy to a great extent. The thesis also proves that the specific definition of both central bank independence and accountability influenced the characteristics of quantitative resp. credit easing. Moreover, such monetary policy can potentially endanger the independence of both central banks in many ways. Thus, the implementation of quantitative easing itself and its potential consequences evidences that the contemporary conception of central bank independence and accountability is insufficient and needs to be reviewed.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:358886 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Pýchová, Jitka |
| Contributors | Ševčík, Miroslav, Řežábek, Pavel |
| Publisher | Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds