In this dissertation I study theories on auctions with participation costs with
various information structure.
Chapter II studies equilibria of second price auctions with differentiated participation
costs. We consider equilibria in independent private values environments where
bidders? entry costs are common knowledge while valuations are private information.
We identify two types of equilibria: monotonic equilibria in which a higher participation
cost results in a higher cutoff point for submitting a bid, and neg-monotonic
equilibria in which a higher participation cost results in a lower cutoff point. We show
that there always exists a monotonic equilibrium, and further, that the equilibrium
is unique for concave distribution functions and strictly convex distribution functions
with some additional conditions. There exists a neg-monotonic equilibrium when the
distribution function is strictly convex and the difference of the participation costs
is sufficiently small. We also provide comparative static analysis and study the limit
status of equilibria when the difference in bidders' participation costs approaches zero.
Chapter III studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participation
costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution
functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that
there always exists an equilibrium for this general economy, and further there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium when all bidders are ex ante homogenous. Moreover,
we identify a sufficient condition under which we have a unique equilibrium in a heterogeneous economy with two bidders. Our general framework covers many relevant
models in the literature as special cases.
Chapter IV characterizes equilibria of first price auctions with participation costs
in the independent private values environment. We focus on the cutoff strategies in
which each bidder participates and submits a bid if his value is greater than or equal to
a critical value. It is shown that, when bidders are homogenous, there always exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium, and further, there is no other equilibrium when
valuation distribution functions are concave. However, when distribution functions
are elastic at the symmetric equilibrium, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. We
find similar results when bidders are heterogenous.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:tamu.edu/oai:repository.tamu.edu:1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-08-857 |
| Date | 14 January 2010 |
| Creators | Cao, Xiaoyong |
| Contributors | Tian, Guoqiang |
| Source Sets | Texas A and M University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Book, Thesis, Electronic Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
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