I propose a new theory of vagueness centered around the epistemology and normativity of vagueness. The theory is a version of epistemicism—the view that vagueness is a fundamentally epistemic phenomenon—that improves upon existing epistemicist accounts by accommodating both the alleged tolerance and open texture of vague predicates, while foregoing excessive metaphysical commitments. I offer a novel solution to the infamous Sorites paradox, one that outrivals alternative contextualist theories in their ability to explain the phenomenology of vagueness as well as its deontic consequences.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UTEXAS/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/30994 |
| Date | 08 September 2015 |
| Creators | Hu, Ivan J. |
| Contributors | Sainsbury, R. M. (Richard Mark), Kamp, Hans |
| Source Sets | University of Texas |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | application/pdf |
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