Return to search

The Myth of Strategic Superiority: Us Nuclear Weapons and Limited Conflicts, 1945-1954

The nuclear age provided U.S. soldiers and statesmen with unprecedented challenges. the U.S. military had to incorporate a weapon into strategic calculations without knowing whether the use of the weapon would be approved. Broad considerations of policy led President Dwight Eisenhower to formulate a policy that relied on nuclear weapons while fully realizing their destructive potential. Despite the belief that possession of nuclear weapons provided strategic superiority, the U.S. realized that such weapons were of little value. This realization did not stop planners from attempting to find ways to use nuclear weapons in Korea and Indochina.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:unt.edu/info:ark/67531/metadc115124
Date05 1900
CreatorsMorse, Eric
ContributorsCitino, Robert, Wawro, Geoffrey, Mitchener, Donald
PublisherUniversity of North Texas
Source SetsUniversity of North Texas
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis or Dissertation
FormatText
RightsPublic, Morse, Eric, Copyright, Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All rights Reserved.

Page generated in 0.0019 seconds