Many empirical and theoretical studies show that workers obtain jobs through their social contacts. This paper attempts to investigate how the difference of individuals’ intrinsic abilities in obtaining their jobs affects the social network structure that emerges. When the probability of players who get job information by themselves is large enough, low-ability players will maintain more contacts than high-ability players do. We analyze the equilibrium network structures in homogeneous society and heterogeneous society respectively. For analyzing more complex cases that people are heterogeneous in their ability of obtaining jobs, we suggest a new equilibrium concept: Forward Induction Network Equilibrium (FINE), a refinement of pairwise stability equilibrium. According to FINE, the possible equilibrium network structures can be reduced drastically and the outcomes are either symmetric or close-to-symmetric equilibrium networks. We show that the difference of social contacts among overall individuals is no greater than one contact in the close-to-symmetric equilibrium networks.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0095258008 |
| Creators | 吳信毅, Wu, Shin Yi |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
Page generated in 0.0012 seconds