本文考慮一家既存廠商面對一家潛在參進者時，是否會建置超額產能以提高利潤；尤其，是否會刻意擴大產能，迫使潛在參進者放棄參進市場的企圖。既存廠商會善用超額產能，提高自身的產量與利潤；潛在參進者在超額產能存在成本之下，也會建置超額產能。潛在參進者也希望藉由產能的宣示，造成既成事實，讓既存廠商得知，既然有意參進就有十足的決心，不容輕易被擊退；然而，在既存廠商已率先建置超額產能之下，為避免產業整體產能過大，產量過多，造成價格大幅下跌的窘境，只能限縮自己的產能，在居於後行動者的劣勢下，仍舊無法超越既存廠商之超額產能及產能超額率。在產能較小之下，意味潛在參進者的邊際生產成本會小於既存廠商，當雙方同時且互相獨立決定產量時，如果不考慮產能，潛在參進者在產品市場，其實是擁有相對優勢，但終究還是產能決定產量，潛在參進者只能生產較少的產量，獲得較低的利潤。在潛在參進者可以造成生產時不存在固定成本的前提下，既存廠商只能以無超額產能的邊際成本訂定價格，才能刻意將參進者阻卻在市場之外；然而，由於該產量下，仍必須建置超額產能，使得生產時的邊際成本會大於價格，造成既存廠商的虧損。換言之，既存廠商無法透過刻意的作為將參進者阻卻在市場之外。既存廠商在擁有先行動者優勢之下，其產能、產量及產能超額率皆會大於雙方同時決定產能時，最終也會獲得較高的利潤；同時，會造成參進者的利潤損失。同於Stackelberg 與 Cournot 競爭的相對關係，會使得產業利潤小於同時決定產能之情況。不過，由於雙方都擁有超額產能，使得產量增加，消費者剩餘會大幅提升，同時其增加足以彌補產業利潤之下降，經濟福利將因超額產能之擴大而提升。設若如此，就建置超額產能是否足以構成不當行為，可以透過簡單的方式加以檢視。即既存廠商建置超額產能後，是否仍有參進者進入市場，倘若參進者仍得以進入市場，則超額產能之建置不宜視為既存廠商之不當行為。 / 摘要............................I
目錄............................II
第一章 緒論 ...................1
第一節 前言................1
第二節 研究動機與目的......2
第三節 研究方法與架構......4
第二章 文獻探討................5
第三章 模型設定................10
第一節 產品市場之競爭..........10
第二節 潛在參進者之產能建置....11
第三節 既存廠商之產能建置......11
第四章 均衡分析................13
第五章 延伸分析................21
第一節 產量之決定..........21
第二節 產能之建置.........21
第六章 結論....................25
參考文獻 .......................26
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TW/103FGU00389005 |
| Date | January 1900 |
| Creators | 涂淑芬, SHU-FEN TU |
| Contributors | 林啟智 |
| Publisher | 佛光大學, 經濟學系 |
| Source Sets | National Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations in Taiwan |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | Unknown |
| Type | 碩士 |
| Format | 32 |
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