本研究主要探討主貸行和參貸行之間的資訊不對稱如何影響聯貸案的定價。利用模型推導出在有資訊訊號和較低債權人保護的體制下,最適的聯貸案利率會較高;利用1982年到2009年的全球聯貸案資料進行實證,發現實證結果與理論預期一致。 / This paper explores how information asymmetry between lead arrangers and participant lenders affects syndicated loan pricing. The model shows that the optimal loan spread is higher in regimes with informative signal and lower creditor rights protection. Using global syndicated loan data from 1982 to 2009, I show that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0097357010 |
Creators | 楊雅靖, Yang, Ya Ching |
Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
Language | 英文 |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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