Malware detection is typically performed using either software scanners running inside the operating system or external devices designed to validate the integrity of the kernel. This thesis proposes a hypervisor-based malware that compromises the system by targeting the hard disk drive and leaving the kernel unmodified. The hypervisor is able to issue read and write commands to the disk while actively hiding these actions from the operating system and any detection software therein. Additionally, the hypervisor’s presence has minimal impact on the performance of the system. The ability to perform these commands compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the stored data. As a result, this thesis has widespread implications affecting personal, corporate, and government users alike.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:MSSTATE/oai:scholarsjunction.msstate.edu:td-1809 |
| Date | 11 May 2013 |
| Creators | Martin, Jaron W |
| Publisher | Scholars Junction |
| Source Sets | Mississippi State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Theses and Dissertations |
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