This paper concerns the dominant conceptual or formal accounts of legal rights: the Interest and Will Theories. Section II clarifies the minimal necessary conditions for a rights model to count as a Will Theory. It also explores Kant’s Will Theory of rights and the difficulties posed to it by Hohfeld’s schema of jural relations. Kant has three alternatives: reject the schema’s utility or demonstrate his theory’s compatibility with it via molecularist or basic models of Hohfeldian rights. Although his best option is to disavow Hohfeld, Kant’s theory is ultimately undesirable on other grounds. Section III shall analyze the modern Will and Interest Theories’ biggest weaknesses according to a test proposed in Section I, which should generate bases for preferring one theory to another. It will offer a counterargument to the Inalienability charge levied against the Will Theory, and demonstrate why Interest Theory responses to the Third Party Beneficiary argument are inadequate.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/25585 |
| Date | 31 December 2010 |
| Creators | Frydrych, David |
| Contributors | Benson, Peter |
| Source Sets | University of Toronto |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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