Independently of whether dispositions are understood as essential potencies, powers or mere capacities, it has been acknowledged that there is a direct connection between them and causation. Thus, the attention of metaphysicians has recently turned 10 an explanation DJ causal relations based on dispositions. This thesis is a study on the possibility of formulating a dispositional account of causation and about the way such an account can be articulated. I examine two main issues: first, how exactly do dispositional properties participate in causal processes? Second, how exactly is the relation between dispositional properties and their manifestations to be understood? I argue that in order to understand the nature of the participation of dispositional properties in causal processes, we need a distinction between two kinds of dispositional properties, that I will call capacities and dispositions: only by distinguishing between the two can we understand how a dispositional cause is formed. Moreover, I defend the thesis that dispositions necessitate their manifestations .
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:601182 |
Date | January 2012 |
Creators | Pechlivanidi, Elina |
Publisher | University of Bristol |
Source Sets | Ethos UK |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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