Physicalism is the dominant metaphysical position III contemporary philosophy of mind, and it is generally acknowledged that we should expect our account of perception and perceptual experience to be compatible with this framework. It is also thought to be important that our philosophical account of perceptual experience should be consistent with what scientists tell us about the processes involved. As such, after a discussion of the general issues surrounding the physicalist theory of mind, I will assume that both of these expectations are appropriate. My primary aim is to describe the account of perceptual experience we must endorse if we want to be consistent physicalists. This account has some rather counter-intuitive consequences, the most notable of which is that perceptual experiences are not assessable for accuracy. The fact that perceptual experiences are intentional states will be instrumental in explaining why we find the idea that perceptual experiences are not assessable for accuracy so counter-intuitive, and also in enabling us to recognise that the claim is true notwithstanding its apparent implausibility.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:628537 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Gow, Laura |
| Publisher | University of Reading |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Page generated in 0.1092 seconds