In this dissertation I argue that a neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethic is a viable position in moral philosophy, preferable to deontology, consequentialism and neo-Aristotelianism. I do this by arguing that, as Schopenhauer’s main criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy apply to contemporary deontology and consequentialism, virtue ethics is preferable to both. I defend the Schopenhauerian claim that compassion is the basis of morality by appealing to its intuitive plausibility and by arguing for a neo-Schopenhauerian version of the Aristotelian idea that the virtues are constitutive of the good life. I further support the claim that compassion is the basis of morality by illustrating how compassion can account for a range of our core moral concepts and intuitions. 1 also defend neo-Schopenhauerianism against, a number of criticisms of virtue ethics in general and neo-Schopenhauerianism in particular. I conclude by arguing that as the Aristotelian virtues of courage, temperance, prudence, etc., could be possessed by someone who is malicious and/or extremely selfish, and so do not capture our intuitions about what makes a person morally good, neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethics is preferable to Aristotelianism.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:728826 |
Date | January 2017 |
Creators | Weatherup, Michael Norman |
Publisher | Queen's University Belfast |
Source Sets | Ethos UK |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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