This thesis is an outline and defence of the descriptive and evaluative power of a capacity-based theory of moral culpability for wrongdoing. Examinations and defences of capacity-based theories of moral culpability for wrongdoing are numerous. This thesis advances the debate in three ways. First, it gives a more articulate definition of the notion of capacity and organises human capacities in an illuminating way for the purposes of understanding moral culpability for wrongdoing. Secondly, it explains and defends a particular conception of the significance of the notion of capacity for moral culpability for wrongdoing. This significance lies in the existence and manner of exercise of human capacities. Moral responsibility requires the existence of certain capacities, and the allocation of blame amongst morally responsible wrongdoers depends on a moral evaluation of how these capacities are exercised. Thirdly, it argues that the conflict between character, choice and capacity as theories of moral culpability for wrongdoing is based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between them; once this misunderstanding is dispelled, it becomes possible to see that a theory based on capacity is correct.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:589771 |
| Date | January 2003 |
| Creators | Slater, A. James |
| Publisher | University of Birmingham |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Page generated in 0.0045 seconds