本論文旨在闡釋費希特之超驗哲學的知識論面向。處理這問題的過程除了闡釋部份外還會涉及兩個觀點。第一個觀點是透過歷史的角度來揭露費氏的早期知識學(Wissenschaftslehre)所處置的理論哲學脈絡，而第二個觀點則是從一個當代角度去考察費氏的早期知識學作為一知識論策略的本質並檢討當代對其哲學以基礎論(foundationalism)及反基礎論(anti-foundationalism)作評斷的考察方式。對費氏理論集中闡釋的部份則成為樞紐把兩觀點貫穿起來。第一個觀點的作用在於透過把費氏的理論放置於其獨特的、特殊的背景下理解來防止時代錯置的判斷(anachronism)，而這樣也為我們提供理解費氏哲學的恰當途徑。這對闡釋費氏的理論有關鍵的理解作用而不只具有歷史意義。而第二個觀點雖然較易傾向時代錯置，但可以透過當代的資源和方法來為問題作翻新的處理。這做法有助突顯闡釋中隱藏的、未被充份處理的問題，而透過處理這些問題可側面地補充闡釋。因此本論文主要有三大部份。第一部份著重解釋在甚麼意義下費氏知識學趨生於三個哲學家雅各比（而從他關聯到斯賓洛沙）、康德 和 萊茵霍爾德(K. L. Reinhold)的理論脈絡並試圖作出回應。明白這點則不難理解第二部份之主張費氏所提出的三個基本原則其用意其實是要把人類知識基礎建於人類自發性之上。第三部份（即上述所指的對當代觀點的處理）則會指出把費氏理論詮釋成反基礎論是不準確和誤導的，他的理論反而指向一抗拒這種二分法的統一性。 / This thesis aims at explicating the epistemological aspects of Fichte's transcendental philosophy from a historical perspective that exposes the theoretical philosophical context in which Fichte's early philosophical project Wissenschaftslehre is embedded, as well as from a contemporary perspective that examines the nature of Fichte’s epistemological strategy and reviews the examination of it in foundationalist and anti-foundationalist terms. The first perspective prevents anachronism by situating the theory within the unique particular background, which also gives us a proper access to the philosophy of Fichte. The latter perspective, though could be prone to anachronism, gives the problematic a refreshment by bringing in contemporary resources and devices to review the theory. An explication of Fichte's three fundamental principles and an analysis of the third as the culmination of foundation make up the hinge that connects both perspectives. The first perspective is an essential prologue to the explication, its significance lies not in merely giving out information of the historical development, but in making the theory itself intelligible; the second perspective considers an issue that is hidden in the explication but not yet sufficiently addressed, and in addressing this perspective I provide a review of the review, through which the explication can be supplemented. / Hence it should be obvious that the thesis consists of three parts and how they are connected. The first part sets up the historical background through which the epistemological relevance of Fichte is to be appreciated. Three philosophers are given extra weight for this purpose Jacobi (and through him Spinoza as well), Kant, and Reinhold. It is in the face of a particular set of issues resulting from their interaction that Fichte's theory of knowledge emerges to resolve. With this in mind, we will find that Fichte's proposal of the fundamental principles is a strategy to ground the foundation of knowledge on human spontaneity, as spontaneity is found to be the necessary condition for the third principle and the third principle the necessary condition for the coordination of the first two principles which Fichte takes as hardly disputable. Based on this understanding, we shall see that Rockmore’s suggestion to understand Fichte's theory of knowledge as a kind of anti-foundationalism is inaccurate and misleading, instead it rather points to a theoretical tendency that resists such dichotomy. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Tse, Chiu Yui Plato. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-112). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Acknowledgement --- p.1 / Introduction --- p.2 / Chapter One: --- p.6 / The Relevance of the Absolute to the Foundation of Knowledge / The Epistemological Relevance of the Absolute --- p.7 / Jacobi’s Spinozakritik: The Skeptic Consequence of “Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit“ --- p.12 / Jacobi’s Kantkritik --- p.16 / Reinhold’s Principle of Consciousness and Beyond --- p.29 / Chapter Two: --- p.35 / Part I / The Three Fundamental Principles: With an Explanation of a Common Phenomenon of Consciousness / The I-Talk --- p.38 / The First Principle --- p.42 / The Second Principle --- p.44 / The Third Principle --- p.46 / The Absolute I and the Forgotten --- p.49 / Part II / An Analysis through a Dialectics of Contradictions --- p.52 / Step A --- p.53 / Step B --- p.55 / Step C --- p.58 / Step D --- p.60 / Step E --- p.65 / Chapter Three: --- p.74 / The Conflict between Foundationalist and Anti-foundationalist Interpretation / The Problem --- p.75 / Tom Rockmore’s Anti-foundationalist Interpretation --- p.79 / Problem of Daniel Breazeale’s Response --- p.87 / Klaus Hammacher a Leap towards Certainty --- p.92 / Conclusion --- p.101 / Bibliography --- p.108
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_328675 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Contributors | Tse, Chiu Yui Plato., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, bibliography |
| Format | electronic resource, electronic resource, remote, 1 online resource ([4], 112 leaves) |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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