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Reliabilism and cosmic optimism : situating John Hick in the history of philosophy of religion

This dissertation aims to rehabilitate the reasonableness of Hick’s religious pluralism by disclosing the deep structure of his philosophical system. To realize this aim, this dissertation will introduce a new philosophical method of reliabilism, which is proposed by Ernest Sosa and emphasizes total balance and historical maturation. As a result of the introduction of reliabilism, Hick’s philosophical system is disclosed to be composed of Hick’s own philosophy of personhood, combined with the philosophies of Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume. Instead of emphasizing one of them, this dissertation will propose to read these different components of Hick’s philosophical system as forming a total worldview, which are complementary with each other. Also, this dissertation will situate Hick’s philosophy in the history of philosophy of religion (e.g. pre-analytical paradigms of British Idealism and Critical Realism, and analytical paradigms of Logical Positivism, neo-Wittgensteinian philosophy, and Reformed Epistemology). Hick’s project will be discussed as a recovery of a pre-analytical worldview from within analytical contexts. As Hick’s central philosophical works, this dissertation will focus on Faith and Knowledge and An Interpretation of Religion. Faith and Knowledge has not been examined in detail in past literature. But Hick’s arguments about personhood, Wittgenstein, Kant, and Hume in An Interpretation of Religion originates in Faith and Knowledge (both the first edition and the second edition). A correct understanding of Hick’s religious pluralism in An Interpretation of Religion is impossible without a detailed examination of Faith and Knowledge.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:692747
Date January 2016
CreatorsKitta, Naoki
PublisherUniversity of Nottingham
Source SetsEthos UK
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
Sourcehttp://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/33624/

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