There are three main powers in any decision-making situation: agenda-setting, voting, and voice. One of these - 'the power of voice' - is the great unknown. To analyse this power, this dissertation develops a general model of law-making using two basic premises: (1) a distinction between policies and outcomes, and (2) the costs of transmission of policy-relevant information. The model divides the law-making game in two sub-games: a lobbying sub-game, where an indefinite number of lobbyists provide legislative bodies with information; and a legislative sub-game, where legislative bodies bargain with that information under a given decision rule. The general model is then applied to the three main EC legislative procedures (consultation, assent and co-decision), which produces a series of propositions about how the power of voice operates, relative to the power of veto. These propositions are then tested, using data on nearly two thousand legislative procedures from the 1989-1999 period and the results of an issue-based survey of political consultants. Two case studies then illustrate the workings of the powers of voice and veto, respectively. Finally, the conclusions focus on the nature of the power of voice, the informational rationale of its delegation, and the implications for the accountability of the EU.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:645573 |
| Date | January 2002 |
| Creators | Varela, Diego |
| Publisher | London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2283/ |
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