This thesis critically examines the Central Intelligence Agency's hand in the decision-making process through a detailed and careful analysis of its daily, weekly and ad hoc intelligence reports. The research is significant because, in the early years of the Cold War, particularly during the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, Washington was unsure whether Soviet provocations were local or global. Based on the premise that the CIA had a mixture of successes and failures, this study will demonstrate that, with relative consistency, intelligence analysts provided relatively perceptive assessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions. In part. because of CIA assessments, US policymakers were better able to conclude that the Kremlin was unable and unwilling to risk a direct military confrontation with the United States during these two crises.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:501743 |
| Date | January 2009 |
| Creators | Barlow, John |
| Publisher | University of East Anglia |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/10629/ |
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