This thesis examines the evolution of US-Iranian relations between 1961 and 1972 as Washington and Tehran engaged in a contest over modernization. During this period the United States adopted a series of policies that helped to bolster the Shah’s regime by prioritising the need for stability above considerations of economic and political development. Despite the different views of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon about the Shah, there existed remarkable continuity in each of their methods and objectives regarding Iran. While many US officials under each of these presidents considered modernization theory an important concept for understanding the trajectory of history and progress in the developing world, its actual impact on US policy was limited. By focusing their attention on stability, US officials sought to maintain a close relationship with the Shah, who adeptly manipulated American fears of Soviet encroachment to extract concessions regarding military sales and credit. Moreover, as the Shah’s independence from American guidance increased and US influence over Tehran decreased commensurately during the 1960s, the influence of modernization theory in US policy also diminished. This thesis argues that, from the very beginning of the 1960s, this declining influence - of Washington over Tehran and modernization in US policy - led to the United States coming to accept and ultimately embrace the Shah's vision of modernity for Iran.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:716837 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Offiler, Ben |
| Publisher | University of Nottingham |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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