This thesis is aimed at solving this puzzle: If the rules are the same, how do regulatory authorities compete for business firms to come to their jurisdictions? I suggest that it is better to think of regulatory competition in terms of regulating and regulated sides finding a partner to form a marriage. I argue that an important dimension to regulatory competition is competition between different types of microlevel enforcement regimes for different types of firms. Assuming the rules stay the same, depending on the match or mismatch of regimes’ and firms’ preferences, enforcement regimes have differential results in business attraction, enforcement effect and regulatory advantage. This argument is elucidated by a so-called ER (enforcement regime) Framework that uses the cultural institutionalist approach – a fusion of historical institutionalism and Mary Douglas’ grid-group typology. The framework is used to interpret the empirical findings about regulatory competition for foreign investment in China. The thesis adds to our knowledge about the dynamics both of regulatory competition and of enforcement regimes, and helps to fill the gap that exists between the literatures in these two areas.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:634503 |
| Date | January 2014 |
| Creators | Xiao, Yin |
| Publisher | London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1035/ |
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