In an interval society, voters are represented by intervals on the real line, corresponding to their approval sets on a linear political spectrum. I imagine the society to be a representative democracy, and ask how to choose members of the society as representatives. Following work in mathematical psychology by Coombs and others, I develop a measure of the compatibility (political similarity) of two voters. I use this measure to determine the popularity of each voter as a candidate. I then establish local “agreeability” conditions and attempt to find a lower bound for the popularity of the best candidate. Other results about certain special societies are also obtained
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:hmc_theses-1044 |
Date | 01 April 2013 |
Creators | Carlson, Rosalie J |
Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | HMC Senior Theses |
Rights | © 2013 Rosalie J. Carlson |
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