Heightened self-focused attention (SFA), a tendency to direct awareness to internal, self-referent information, has been implicated in a number of psychological disorders. This review concentrates on the theoretical and empirical validity of attempts to extend normative models of SFA (e.g. Duval & Wicklund, 1972 Carver & Scheier, 1978) to account for anxious states and anxiety disorders. It will be argued that existing models are too non-specific, with similar accounts having been put forward across different disorders, reducing the explanatory power of the framework. Therefore two novel distinctions will be put forward to attempt to meaningfully fractionate SFA. First, self-awareness may be directed to different parts of internal experience, in particular to body-state information or mental-state information, and therefore potentially maintain psychopathology in different ways. Second, a distinction can be made between the habitual tendency to engage SFA (or degree) and the precision with which this mechanism operates (or accuracy). Ways to validate these distinctions will be proposed and how such a model could potentially differentiate anxiety disorders from other forms of psychopathology considered.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:644401 |
| Date | January 2006 |
| Creators | Stefanovitch, I. |
| Publisher | University College London (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445111/ |
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