This dissertation describes the formation of support for monetary integration among European countries in the period between 1968 and 1973, claiming that there was a clear connection between the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the rise of support for a European solution to the subsequent monetary turmoil. During the late 1960s, the US administration's attitude of financing the economy through budgetary deficit put the dollar's credibility into question until, in the summer of 1971, fears of a worldwide "bank run" convinced US President Nixon to revoke the gold backing of the currency, hence marking the transition from the Bretton Woods "gold exchange standard" to a pure "dollar standard". However, monetary stability was too important to the European Economic Community, which in 1972 decided to narrow the Bretton Woods exchange rate margins among its members, creating a de facto "snake" within the "tunnel" of Bretton Woods. Historians of the international monetary system described the former part of this story, while historians of European integration focused on the latter. Little has been said on the links between the two processes, and on how they contributed to change the views of the different actors in the policy-making arena over time. Tn order to undertake this exercise, two countries have been chosen, Italy and the United Kingdom, as they provide interesting viewpoints: the former being politically underdeveloped but very enthusiastic about the European project, while the latter enjoyed stronger institutions but has historically kept a certain distance from Europe. Policy-makers, a category composed of politicians, civil servants and central bankers, emerge as the core actors; in both cases, international cooperation had to deal with domestic issues, and in both cases fervent supporters and opponents of Europe were present at all levels, creating a seemingly unpredictable interaction. However, a certain pattern could be observed, whereby supporters of a worldwide fixed exchange rates system were fewer and fewer compared to supporters of the European link. The pivotal time of such shift has been identified in the few months spanning from Nixon's decision to close the gold window in August 1971 until the implementation of the European "monetary snake" in April 1972. Domestic events such as the devaluation of the British pound in 1967 or the "hot autumn" of 1969 in Italy had a less powerful effect. This conclusion also shows that, in both case studies, the monetary choice in favour of Europe was taken on the basis of the demise of Bretton Woods, and hence, of economic interest rather than on the basis of ideology.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:611792 |
| Date | January 2009 |
| Creators | Natali, Paolo |
| Publisher | University of Cambridge |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/275251 |
Page generated in 0.0015 seconds