This dissertation will analyse the grand strategy of the Russian empire against its southern rivals, namely the Ottoman empire and Iran, in the Caucasus, between 1821 and 1833. This research is interested in explaining how the Russian imperial machine devised and executed successful strategies to use its relative superiority over the Ottomans and the Qājārs and secure domination of the region. Russian success needs, however, to be understood within a broader context that also takes in Ottoman and Iranian policy-making and perspectives, and is informed by a comparative sense of the strengths and weaknesses of all three imperial regimes. In this thesis, the question of why Russia was more successful than the Ottoman state and Iran in the Caucasus between 1821 and 1833 is explained in three main ways: the first and most important factor in this process was the well-functioning fiscal-military machine of the Russian empire; the second factor was the diplomatic and military skill of the Russian leadership which helped to avert any effective political and military alliance between the Ottoman empire and Iran and defeated its rivals in two separate and successive wars; the last main factor in Russian success was its geopolitically superior position.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:713425 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Keçeci, Serkan |
| Publisher | London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London) |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3512/ |
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