Using original archival materials from the Commonwealth Secretariat and the UK National Archives, as well as private paper collections, this thesis examines the experience of the Commonwealth summits (CPMM/CHOGM) in dealing with the Rhodesia problem from 1966 until 1979. In doing so it pays particular attention to the role of the British government and the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat. Rhodesia emerged as a major international and a Commonwealth problem after Ian Smith, the leader of the Rhodesia Front announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. Britain refused to acknowledge the independence of Rhodesia without a constitutional conference and majority rule. The British government fixed on economic sanctions as the main policy to end the rebellion without intensifying the armed struggle, but this moderate approach provoked outrage from many African Commonwealth leaders. Ghana and Tanzania even broke off diplomatic relations with Britain while others threatened to leave the Commonwealth. Rhodesia remained on the agenda of Commonwealth meetings until the CHOGM in Lusaka in 1979; this paved the way to a Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House, which resulted in a settlement. Somehow the system of Commonwealth summits had survived a long-running and highly-charged crisis. In exploring how this came about, the thesis particularly argues that members' national interests, including those of Britain and the African Commonwealth, combined to make agreement between them, rather than a rift, highly desirable. Furthermore, Commonwealth summits continued to evolve throughout the period, in ways that made common understanding easier to achieve.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:716672 |
| Date | January 2016 |
| Creators | Jamaluddin, Jazliza |
| Publisher | University of Nottingham |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
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