We are responsible for some things but not for others. In this thesis, I investigate what it takes for an entity to be responsible for something. This question has two components: agents and actions. I argue for a permissive view about agents. Entities such as groups or artificially intelligent systems may be agents in the sense required for responsibility. With respect to actions, I argue for a causal view. The relation in virtue of which agents are responsible for actions is a causal one. I claim that responsibility requires causation and I develop a causal account of agency. This account is particularly apt for addressing the relationship between agency and moral responsibility and sheds light on the causal foundations of moral responsibility.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:684683 |
Date | January 2015 |
Creators | Himmelreich, Johannes |
Publisher | London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London) |
Source Sets | Ethos UK |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Source | http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3277/ |
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