In this thesis we examine three aspects of procurement policy in the context of asymmetric information. In Chapter 1, we identify an incentive for the contracted firm to underinvest in the comprehensiveness of its internal accounting system, a result similar to that due to Averch and Johnson (1962). The policy implications of this distortion are analysed using both a theoretical construct and numerical simulation. In Chapter 2, we identify a class of distortions generated by the practice of paying 'progress payments' to contracted firms in a model in which 'real' and 'symbolic' progress are not inextricably linked, and in which the procurement agency observes only the latter. In Chapter 3 we construct a simple dual-sector model in which a paternalist government uses bailouts to sustain faltering firms. The firm, knowing the motivation of its client, has an incentive to exploit that knowledge. This complicates the procurement problem in a manner explored in Chapter 3.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.39374 |
| Date | January 1992 |
| Creators | Liston, Catherine |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Economics.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001318476, proquestno: NN80272, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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