The thesis examines the formation and development of post-World War II international collaboration in the economic regulation of the commercial aspects (i.e., market entry; market shares and prices) of civil aviation. Specifically, it studies the formation and operation of one type of international
regime: a cartel. The thesis seeks to answer two questions: why do states cooperate to support an international cartel? And why do states cease to support a cartel?
The study proposes three reasons why states will support a cartel: (1) to promote consumer welfare and the growth of the industry; (2) to ensure the development and protection of their national carriers; and (3) in response to hegemonic activity.
It then considers why states cease to participate in the cartel arrangements.
This occurs: if states no longer believe that the cartel is promoting
consumer welfare and industrial growth; if they conclude that their industry no longer benefits from cartel protection; or if the hegemon is unable
or unwilling, or both, to support the regime.
All three give valuable insights. Nevertheless, the author proposes that it is possible to establish a hierarchy of usefulness according to the depth and scope of understanding offered by each explanation. It is argued that hegemonic stability theory provides the most useful insights. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UBC/oai:circle.library.ubc.ca:2429/26790 |
| Date | January 1987 |
| Creators | Busza, Eva |
| Publisher | University of British Columbia |
| Source Sets | University of British Columbia |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis/Dissertation |
| Rights | For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. |
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