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Clientelism and Party Politics| Evidence from Nigeria

<p> This dissertation provides an explanation for the workings of clientelism and some preliminary insights on the conditions under which it can recede. </p><p> First, I provide evidence from Nigeria on the &ldquo;loyal-voter anomaly&rdquo; (Stokes et al. 2013, 66): I show that political parties tend to target clientelistic transfers to partisans, whose votes should already be secure, rather than to swing voters, whose votes are up for grabs. Second, I develop a theory of <i>strategic safe-betting</i> to explain the disproportionate targeting of partisans. This theory puts the emphasis on risk mitigation, an aspect of clientelistic relations that existing explanations tend to overlook. I argue that clientelistic transfers are risky and expensive endeavors, and that loyal voters represent a safer bet for political parties: their voting behavior is indeed easier to influence, predict or, in a best-case scenario, monitor. This is due to their close ties to the operatives of the party machine, as well as their deeper embeddedness in <i>networks of control</i> through which parties exert influence and gather information on voters before and during elections. Third, I provide preliminary insights on the demise of clientelism. I show that macro developments&mdash;in particular urbanization and economic development&mdash;that increase the weight of swing voters make clientelistic transfers riskier and provide incentives for parties to develop programmatic promises during elections. </p><p> The dissertation builds on original quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence from the most populous sub-Saharan African country, Nigeria. It draws on observational and experimental survey data to provide a quantitative analysis of the determinants and workings of clientelism at the individual level. It also builds on selected archival documents and in-depth key informant interviews to develop a qualitative narrative of the historical roots of clientelistic partisan pacts in Nigeria and the mechanisms that sustain and break them in contemporary politics.</p><p>

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:PROQUEST/oai:pqdtoai.proquest.com:10826911
Date17 August 2018
CreatorsZovighian, Diane
PublisherGeorgetown University
Source SetsProQuest.com
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typethesis

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