The thesis investigates if investors on the Swedish Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stockholm, are compensated with a premium for holding shares in family firms due to family-specific agency costs between 2015 to 2019. The thesis uses a portfolio-based approach where the risk-adjusted returns are calculated with the Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart’s four-factor model. A portfolio consisting of family firms displays a positive weekly alpha between 0,14 to 0,21 percent, 7,28 to 10,92 percent on a yearly basis, indicating a premium for holding shares in family firms. Additionally, the results show that firms where families control a majority of the votes lead to higher abnormal returns. A portfolio consisting of family firms with over 50 percent voting rights generate abnormal returns of 0,16 to 0,26 percent weekly, and 10,92 to 13,52 percent yearly. Higher abnormal returns when the control is higher further implies that investors are compensated with a premium for family-specific agency costs when buying shares in family-controlled firms.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-533375 |
| Date | January 2024 |
| Creators | Boestad Schön, Gabriel, Ewaldsson, David |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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