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Moral agency : an embodied narrative approach

In this thesis I propose that emotions and rationality are integrated, and jointly constitute our moral agency. I argue against the influential ‘sentimentalist’ claim that emotions are the only constituents of the moral reasons for which we act, by showing that emotions are inextricably bound up with our sensory and conceptual capacities. In contrast, I propose we act for moral reasons when we act in light of the narratives we create and understand. Narrative understanding here is the capacity to inhabit a chain of events. It is embodied and action-­‐ orientated, and is co-­‐constituted through our emotional, conceptual and sensory capacities.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:735815
Date January 2017
CreatorsHardt, Rosa Erica
ContributorsVierkant, Tillman ; Ward, Dave ; Mason, Elinor
PublisherUniversity of Edinburgh
Source SetsEthos UK
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
Sourcehttp://hdl.handle.net/1842/25754

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