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Gate-level Leakage Assessment and Mitigation

Side-channel leakage, caused by imperfect implementation of cryptographic algorithms in hardware, has become a serious security threat for connected devices that generate and process sensitive data. This side-channel leakage can divulge secret information in the form of power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. The side-channel leakage of a crytographic device is commonly assessed after tape-out on a physical prototype.

This thesis presents a methodology called Gate-level Leakage Assessment (GLA), which evaluates the power-based side-channel leakage of an integrated circuit at design time. By combining side-channel leakage assessment with power simulations on the gate-level netlist, GLA is able to pinpoint the leakiest cells in the netlist in addition to assessing the overall side-channel vulnerability to side-channel leakage. As the power traces obtained from power simulations are noiseless, GLA is able to precisely locate the sources of side-channel leakage with fewer measurements than on a physical prototype. The thesis applies the methodology on the design of a encryption co-processor to analyze sources of side-channel leakage.

Once the gate-level leakage sources are identified, this thesis presents a logic level replacement strategy for the leakage sources that can thwart side-channel leakage. The countermeasures presented selectively replaces gate-level cells with a secure logic style effectively removing the side-channel leakage with minimal impact in area. The assessment methodology along with the countermeasures demonstrated is a turnkey solution for IP module designers and is also applicable to larger system level designs. / Master of Science / Consider how a lie detector machine works. It looks for subtle changes in a person’s pulse to tell if the person is telling the truth. This unintentional divulgence of secret information is called a side-channel leakage.

Integrated circuits reveal secret information in a similar way through their power consumption. This is caused by the transistors, used to build these integrated circuits, switching in concert with the secret data being processed by the integrated circuit. Typically, integrated circuits are evaluated for side-channel leakage only after they have been manufactured into a physical prototype. If the integrated circuit is found vulnerable it is too expensive to manufacture the prototype again with an updated design.

This thesis presents a methodology, Gate-level Leakage Assessment (GLA) to evaluate integrated circuits for side-channel leakage during their design process even before they are manufactured. This methodology uses simulations to identify the specific transistors in the design that cause side-channel leakage. Moreover, this thesis presents a technique to selectively replace these problematic transistors in the design with an implementation that thwarts side channel leakage.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/101862
Date22 July 2019
CreatorsKathuria, Tarun
ContributorsElectrical and Computer Engineering, Schaumont, Patrick R., Patterson, Cameron D., Jian, Xun
PublisherVirginia Tech
Source SetsVirginia Tech Theses and Dissertation
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
FormatETD, application/pdf
RightsIn Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

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