The endowment and the framing effect are widely examined cognitive biases. The experimental economics literature, using choice data gathered through an elicitation device, commonly finds evidence of these biases. Recent work by Cason & Plott (2014) shows that the interpretation of choice data as consistent with biases related non-standard preference theory could also be consistent with confusion or misconception of the game type used to elucidate preferences. I use the Cason and Plott card auction framework to analyze offers of buyers and sellers in an experimental setting with subjects from the University of New Orleans simulating 97 sellers and 90 buyers. The two games have symmetric payoffs in order to examine cognitive biases given subjects’ misconception of the game form. Subjects of both games display misconception of game form that explains both endowment and framing effects by rational confused choice; however, buyers display a much greater dispersion of offers than sellers. I estimate card implied valuation of sellers and buyers given game form misconception and find no statistical endowment effect, but I do find valuation is more uncertain in the buyer’s game. The theory of Rational Inattention predicts this lack of offer symmetry is due to the additional cognitive steps necessary in calculating buyer offers.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uno.edu/oai:scholarworks.uno.edu:td-3477 |
Date | 19 May 2017 |
Creators | Nwadiora, Chinedum D |
Publisher | ScholarWorks@UNO |
Source Sets | University of New Orleans |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations |
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