Strategic behaviors in electricity markets are analyzed. Three related topics are investigated. The first topic is a research about the NE search algorithm for complex non-cooperative games in electricity markets with transmission constraints. Hybrid co-evolutionary programming is suggested and simulated for complex examples. The second topic is an analysis about the competing pricing mechanisms of uniform and pay-as-bid pricing in an electricity market. We prove that for a two-player static game the Nash Equilibrium under pay-as-bid pricing will yield less total revenue in expectation than under uniform pricing when demand is inelastic. The third topic is to address a market power mitigation issue of the current Texas electricity market by limiting Transmission Congestion Right (TCR) ownership. The strategic coordination of inter zonal scheduling and balancing market manipulation is analyzed. A market power measurement algorithm useful to determine the proper level of TCR ownership limitation is suggested. / text
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UTEXAS/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/29850 |
Date | 14 May 2015 |
Creators | Son, You Seok |
Source Sets | University of Texas |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis |
Format | electronic |
Rights | Copyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works. |
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