Competitive dynamics is the study of firms' competitive moves; and corporate governance is the study of the influence of boards of directors on managers. Both areas of study have
revealed important factors that affect performance, such as making aggressive competitive moves and incentivizing managers (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Sanders & Hambrick, 2007).
Despite the ramifications of both perspectives on important firm outcomes, prior research has not linked these two areas. Traditionally, competitive dynamics research has focused on the
market conditions and resources that encourage and enable firms to undertake aggressive competitive actions. Yet, research in this stream has not focused on the influence of directors or
managers in this process. In this sense, competitive dynamics research has made predictions that are inconsistent with corporate governance research by inadvertently assuming that all
managers are equally motivated and equally capable of enacting resources toward aggressive competitive actions. Corporate governance research, on the other hand, has focused on the mechanisms
(i.e., monitoring, incentives, and guidance) that boards use to encourage and enable managers to act in shareholders' best interests. Yet, research on corporate governance has not linked
these mechanisms to competitive interactions among rivalrous firms. Using data from the restaurant industry from 2006-2012, the results support the idea that corporate governance influences
competitive aggression. Results also suggest that industry-specific experience has direct and interactive effects that enhance performance, whereas extra-industry experience can be misapplied
and harm short-term performance. By combining these two areas I provide a realistic and comprehensive model of the way that boards and managers influence competitive outcomes. In doing so, I
extend Chen's (1996) attention-motivation-capability theoretical framework to show that managers differ in their motivation and capability and that these differences are a driving force
behind firm-variance in competitive moves. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Entrepreneurship, Strategy, and Information Systems in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester, 2014. / June 11, 2014. / Board of Directors, CEO Compensation, Competitive Dynamics, Corporate Governance, Human Capital / Includes bibliographical references. / Bruce T. Lamont, Professor Directing Dissertation; James G. Combs, Committee Member; Gerald R. Ferris, Committee Member; R. Michael Holmes, Jr., Committee
Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_253417 |
| Contributors | Zorn, Michelle (authoraut), Lamont, Bruce T. (professor directing dissertation), Hofacker, Charles F. (university representative), Combs, James G. (committee member), Ferris, Gerald R. (committee member), Holmes, R. Michael (Robert Michael) (committee member), Florida State University (degree granting institution), College of Business (degree granting college) |
| Publisher | Florida State University, Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text |
| Format | 1 online resource (105 pages), computer, application/pdf |
| Rights | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). The copyright in theses and dissertations completed at Florida State University is held by the students who author them. |
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