Recent epistemology has been dominated by the knowledge first approach
championed by Timothy Williamson and others, and its influence continues to grow,
spreading into the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and beyond.
Proponents of the knowledge first approach have argued for the centrality and
importance of knowledge in these areas of philosophy by arguing that there is
something wrong with asserting or believing something that one doesn’t know, that
assertion and belief are to be understood in terms of knowledge, and that a
knowledge‐maximizing principle of charity is constitutive of the contents of one’s
assertions and beliefs. I attack the knowledge first approach by developing more
plausible accounts of assertion, belief, and the determination of content that break
these supposed ties with knowledge. / text
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UTEXAS/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/18978 |
| Date | 10 December 2012 |
| Creators | McGlynn, Aidan Neil |
| Source Sets | University of Texas |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Format | electronic |
| Rights | Copyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works. |
Page generated in 0.0034 seconds