This study is a comprehensive account of Indonesian foreign policy. It analyses the perceptions of the country???s foreign policy elite about other states and the manner in which these shape the decision-making process and determine policy outcomes. It demonstrates that the dynamics of Indonesian foreign relations in the reformasi period can be understood in terms of elite perceptions. Policy-makers??? perceptions are as important as realities, insofar as they shape their real actions. The balance-of-threat theory is the principal analytical tool used to examine elite perceptions. The study argues that the key realist balance-of-power theory lacks the power to explain past dynamics or to predict future direction of Indonesian foreign relations. The balance-of-threat theory is employed here as a predictor about how Indonesia will behave and whether it will implement policies intended to prevent other countries from endangering Indonesia???s national interests and security. The combined qualitative and quantitative research strategy is based on, but by no means limited to, archival study, content analysis of literature and official statements of relevant Indonesian policy-makers and the survey data. The latter approach draws on a series of 45 in-depth interviews with members of the Indonesian foreign policy elite. Indonesian relations with the United States and China are the highest concern of the elite. The leaders believe that, in the future, Indonesia will increasingly have to manoeuvre between the two rival powers. While the United States is currently seen as the main security threat to Indonesia, China is considered the main malign factor in the long run with power capabilities that need to be constrained and counter-balanced. The ambiguity, dichotomy and haphazardness that have characterized Indonesian foreign policy in the reformasi period are caused by four factors: first, the existence of a plurality of disparate views and attitudes among the contemporary Indonesian elite; second, the perceived complex security challenges on all fronts that are both internal and external in origins and traditional and non-traditional in nature; third, a low level of elite consensus about how to rank the external threats according to their urgency; and, fourth, a significant disparity between the elite???s present threat assessment and its long-term threat assessment.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/187493 |
Date | January 2007 |
Creators | Novotny, Daniel, School of Politics & International Relations, UNSW |
Publisher | Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Politics and International Relations |
Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Rights | Copyright Daniel Novotny, http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/copyright |
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