This thesis formalizes a model of bounded rationality in extensive-form games called game-playing schemata. In this model, the strategies are repre- sented by a structure consisting of a deterministic finite automaton and two computational functions. The automaton represents a structured memory of the player, while the functions represent the ability of the player to identify efficient abstractions of the game. Together, the schema is a realization of a pure strategy which can be implemented by a player in order to play a given game. The thesis shows how to construct correctly playing schema for every pure strategy in any multi-player extensive-form game with perfect recall and how to evaluate its complexity. It proves that equilibria in schemata strategies always exist and computing them is PPAD-hard. Moreover, for a class of efficiently representable strategies, computing MAXPAY-EFCE can be done in polynomial time. 1
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:365076 |
| Date | January 2017 |
| Creators | Černý, Jakub |
| Contributors | Loebl, Martin, Hladík, Milan |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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