From the 1970s onwards, it is argued that central banks should be independent from politicians since the latter have an interest in seeking populist interventions to the conduct of the monetary policy. Additionally, it is often maintained that the sole aim of a central bank should be to seek price stability. Despite the seemingly neutral and objective tone of these arguments, central bank independence can find its meaning as a part of Neoliberalism, which restructured the economic administration of the state. The main objective of this thesis is to analyse the notion of central bank independence and the case of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey in a multidisciplinary manner, in order to reveal its political and administrative implications.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:METU/oai:etd.lib.metu.edu.tr:http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/3/12610046/index.pdf |
| Date | 01 September 2008 |
| Creators | Ayhan, Berkay |
| Contributors | Ustuner, Yilmaz |
| Publisher | METU |
| Source Sets | Middle East Technical Univ. |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | M.S. Thesis |
| Format | text/pdf |
| Rights | To liberate the content for public access |
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