CEO compensation is an important issue since shareholders, politicians, regulators, and the media have different opinions on the appropriate level. Critics argue that CEO compensation is excessive due to the weak link to firm performance, but even though the field has been thoroughly researched there are mixed findings regarding the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Literature suggests that this could be due to that each economy is unique and has its specificities when determining CEO compensation. CEO compensation in Sweden is generally lower than in the US and Britain, but the performance of the firm is the same or even better. Therefore, the aim of this paper was to study the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in the Swedish context. Through a univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analysis of 38 firms on the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm, our findings show that there is no significant relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in Swedish listed firms when using standard control variables. This result is more consistent with the managerial power theory and less with the agency theory and contract theory. The findings suggest that there is no alignment between Swedish CEOs' compensation incentives and the shareholders' interest (i.e., firm performance).
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-479683 |
| Date | January 2022 |
| Creators | Bååth, Niklas, Janssen, Ludwig |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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