abstract: Libertarians affirm the right to liberty, i.e., the right to do what one wants free from interference. Libertarians also affirm the right to private property. One objection to libertarianism is that private property relations restrict liberty. This objection appears to have the consequence that libertarianism is an incoherent position. I examine Jan Narveson's version of the libertarian view and his defense of its coherence. Narveson understands the right to liberty as a prohibition on the initiation of force. I argue that if that is what the right to liberty is, then the enforcement of property rights violates it. I also examine Narveson's attempt to support private property with his distinction between interference with and mere prevention of activity and argue that this distinction does not do the work that he needs it to do. My conclusion is that libertarianism is, in a sense, impossible because conceptually unsound. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Philosophy 2011
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:9244 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Contributors | Schimke, Christopher (Author), De Marneffe, Peter (Advisor), Mcgregor, Joan (Committee member), Blackson, Thomas (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Source Sets | Arizona State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Masters Thesis |
| Format | 45 pages |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/, All Rights Reserved |
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