Promptness of a reward and penalty system is critical to effectively serve the purpose of incentive provision or prevention from repeating a mistake for judiciary officials. Exactitude of the implementation, on the other hand, depends on whether the resultant verdict is over-crediting the reward or the penalty. As to the scrupulousness of verdicts, it can be evaluated through the consistency of the criteria and the compliance of procedural justice. The fundamental principle to establish a reward and penalty system for civil servants, through internal management activities in government agencies, is to reward those who have an outstanding performance on job duty, an excellent record of service, or a great contribution to the agency, and to punish those who abuse their power, infringe human rights, or have a moral misconduct. Judiciary officials are part of civil servants and their job duty is to assist the proceedings of judiciary cases. They are expected to comply with a higher moral standard than other civil servants.
The reward and penalty system has long existed and practiced for centuries. Its importance to manage a vast body of civil servants is undeniable. Various sources of literature on personnel administration also show that a good system design will have a positive effect to improve job performance and increase morale. However, the number of rewarding case for judiciary officials is far less than that for other civil servants, and very few rewarding cases are proposed. Moreover, no accounting item of the prize for the rewarding cases is officially budgeted. As a result, all of the rewarding cases in the end are treated by giving over-time working salary. This thesis will discuss why the reward and penalty system is designed as a quota system in which the number of rewarding cases has a cap in proportional to the total number of personnel in the court, and whether this is the reason for applying stringent criteria to those whose job is transferred from other government agencies.
This thesis is to study the promptness, exactitude, and scrupulousness of the reward and penalty system for judiciary officials based on the framework of five theoretical aspects, administrative theory, administrative organization, administrative privilege, administrative remedy, and administrative supervision. The difference of the actual practices in the court administrative system versus in other civil-servant agencies will be also discussed. International comparison with the judiciary system in the United States and China is provided, as well as suggestions for future research.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0813109-110220 |
| Date | 13 August 2009 |
| Creators | Huang, Ming-Jen |
| Contributors | Frank.Cs Liu, Deng,Shuai-liang, Chuan-cheng Wu |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0813109-110220 |
| Rights | restricted, Copyright information available at source archive |
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