abstract: With the rise of the Internet of Things, embedded systems have become an integral part of life and can be found almost anywhere. Their prevalence and increased interconnectivity has made them a prime target for malicious attacks. Today, the vast majority of embedded devices are powered by ARM processors. To protect their processors from attacks, ARM introduced a hardware security extension known as TrustZone. It provides an isolated execution environment within the embedded device in which to deploy various memory integrity and malware detection tools.
Even though Secure World can monitor the Normal World, attackers can attempt to bypass the security measures to retain control of a compromised system. CacheKit is a new type of rootkit that exploits such a vulnerability in the ARM architecture to hide in Normal World cache from memory introspection tools running in Secure World by exploiting cache locking mechanisms. If left unchecked, ARM processors that provide hardware assisted cache locking for performance and time-critical applications in real-time and embedded systems would be completely vulnerable to this undetectable and untraceable attack. Therefore, a new approach is needed to ensure the correct use of such mechanisms and prevent malicious code from being hidden in the cache.
CacheLight is a lightweight approach that leverages the TrustZone and Virtualization extensions of the ARM architecture to allow the system to continue to securely provide these hardware facilities to users while preventing attackers from exploiting them. CacheLight restricts the ability to lock the cache to the Secure World of the processor such that the Normal World can still request certain memory to be locked into the cache by the secure operating system (OS) through a Secure Monitor Call (SMC). This grants the secure OS the power to verify and validate the information that will be locked in the requested cache way thereby ensuring that any data that remains in the cache will not be inconsistent with what exists in main memory for inspection. Malicious attempts to hide data can be prevented and recovered for analysis while legitimate requests can still generate valid entries in the cache. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Computer Science 2018
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:asu.edu/item:50522 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Contributors | Gutierrez, Mauricio (Author), Zhao, Ziming (Advisor), Doupe, Adam (Committee member), Shoshitaishvili, Yan (Committee member), Arizona State University (Publisher) |
| Source Sets | Arizona State University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Masters Thesis |
| Format | 56 pages |
| Rights | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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