1Semiconductor supply chain is increasingly getting exposed to variety of security attacks such as Trojan insertion, cloning, counterfeiting, reverse engineering (RE), piracy of Intellectual Property (IP) or Integrated Circuit (IC) and side-channel analysis due to involvement of untrusted parties. In this thesis, we use threshold voltage-defined switches to design a logic gate that will camouflage the conventional logic gates both logically and physically to resist RE and IP piracy. The proposed gate can function as NAND, AND, NOR, OR, XOR, and XNOR robustly using threshold defined switches. We also propose a flavor of camouflaged gate that represents reduced functionality (NAND, NOR and NOT) at much lower overhead. The camouflaged design operates at nominal voltage and obeys conventional reliability limits. A small fraction of gates can be camouflaged to increase the RE effort extremely high. Simulation results indicate 46-53% area, 59-68% delay and 52-76% power overhead when 5-15% gates are identified and camouflaged using the proposed gate. A significant higher RE effort is achieved when the proposed gate is employed in the netlist using controllability, observability and hamming distance sensitivity based gate selection metrics.
1 Information included in this chapter is reprinted from [19] with permission. Copyright permission included in Appendix B.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:USF/oai:scholarcommons.usf.edu:etd-7752 |
| Date | 31 October 2016 |
| Creators | Nirmala, Ithihasa Reddy |
| Publisher | Scholar Commons |
| Source Sets | University of South Flordia |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Graduate Theses and Dissertations |
| Rights | default |
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