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The Investment Effects of Price Caps under Imperfect Competition. A Note.

This note analyzes a simple Cournot model where firms choose outputs and capacities facing varying demand and price-cap regulation. We find that binding price caps set above long-run marginal cost increase (rather than decrease) aggregate capacity investment. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:epub-wu-01_100d
Date January 2008
CreatorsBuehler, Stefan, Burger, Anton, Ferstl, Robert
PublisherForschungsinstitut für Regulierungsökonomie, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
Source SetsWirtschaftsuniversität Wien
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeWorking Paper, NonPeerReviewed
Formatapplication/pdf
Relationhttp://epub.wu.ac.at/1766/

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