Thesis advisor: Richard Cobb-Stevens / This essay addresses the problems posed by proper names in regards to their relationship to that which they name (their "reference"). This relation of a name to its reference serves as a model for how language in general relates to the world as it actually is, making the question of what a name names of vital epistemological importance. The main problem posed by proper names is whether they simply denote, or whether they connote (i.e. have some informational content), and if they connote, what picture should we give of that content? This essay critiques a variety of theories about proper names, including those of Frege, Russell, Kripke, Searle, Evans, and Sainsbury. It concludes that names of unique entities do have informational content, in the form of a yet unspecified family of definite descriptions that rigidly designate an individual, which arises out of various causal chains of communication in a community. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2007. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy. / Discipline: College Honors Program.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:BOSTON/oai:dlib.bc.edu:bc-ir_102174 |
| Date | January 2007 |
| Creators | Bengtson, Ingrid Kestrel |
| Publisher | Boston College |
| Source Sets | Boston College |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, thesis |
| Format | electronic, application/pdf |
| Rights | Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds