This article studies the signal effects between different distribution channels. In this article, we assume the quality of goods only depends on production cost. The production cost is private information only belongs to manufacturers in direct channel. On the other hand, in indirect channel, production cost is information shared by manufactures and retailers, but the consumers will not know the production cost. Referring to consumer side, the demand of high quality goods is higher than the demand of low quality goods. All information is public to all players except the production cost. Therefore, the manufactures who provide high quality goods must signal their quality to consumers to get high sales volume. This research will verify the signaling effect in direct channel then explore the effect in indirect channel. After proving how the signaling effects work in both channels, we compare the effects among different channels. The comparison could help venders who face the adverse selection problems to make their channel strategies.
The research results are as following:
1. No matter direct or indirect channels, the signaling effect get weak with the increase of consumer¡¦s price sensitivity, demand for high end goods and production cost of the goods.
2. The signaling effect in indirect channel is more effective than the effect in direct channel when consumers are with low price sensitivities.
3. The signaling effect in direct channel is more effective than the effect in indirect channel when the cost of goods in the same category is low.
Keywords: signaling game; channel strategies; price strategies.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0729108-101220 |
Date | 29 July 2008 |
Creators | Lu, Chung-Wei |
Contributors | Min-Hsin Huang, Chi Cheng Wu, Lu Hsiao |
Publisher | NSYSU |
Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
Language | Cholon |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0729108-101220 |
Rights | not_available, Copyright information available at source archive |
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