This thesis investigates the determinants and consequences for the CEO selection in Chinese family firms. Employing a special hand-collected database from IPO prospectuses of family controlled firms, I identify three sets of determinants for the CEO selection, to be specific, choice between family and non-family CEOs. The first set of determinants is traditional culture, including regional traditional culture and entrepreneurs' traditional ideology. Families affected more by such traditional culture less likely employ non-family CEOs. The second set of determinants is family human capital. Families with greater human capital have lower probability of choosing non-family CEOs. Among all available family human capital, male family members are more crucial for the CEO selection while female family members are irrelevant. Current CEO selection is part of preparation for future family succession, so the second generation members have negative impact on selecting non-family CEOs, and such effect is more pronounced for male second generations and those who already actively involved in business. The third set of determinants is family specialized assets, including family reputation and political connections. To preserve and capitalized such assets, families with more specialized assets tend to employ fewer non-family CEOs. These determinants also have similar impacts on selecting chairmen and directors. Different CEO selection has various consequences on performance. I first find that non-family CEOs are associated with smaller IPO underpricing. For the long-term performance, I use one and two stage regressions to investigate the consequences of different CEO selection. In one stage regression, I find that firms with non-family CEOs have worse performance, measured by Tobin's Q. In two stage regression, I find the estimated CEO selection has no significant impact on performance. These results can be explained from a comparative advantage perspective that if all firms select CEOs following certain patter, no firms will have comparative advantage over others and less conflict between CEO selection and firms' and families' characteristics. I further find that firms making "wrong" decisions against their specific conditions underperform much worse than peers, due to the comparative disadvantage caused by the conflict between non-family CEOs and firms' and families' specific features. / Li, Sifei. / Advisers: Cong Wang; Joseph P. H. Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-07(E), Section: A. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-63). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:cuhk.edu.hk/oai:cuhk-dr:cuhk_344963 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Contributors | Li, Sifei., Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Business Administration. |
| Source Sets | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Language | English, Chinese |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, theses |
| Format | electronic resource, microform, microfiche, 1 online resource (viii, 103 leaves : ill.) |
| Coverage | China |
| Rights | Use of this resource is governed by the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons “Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International” License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) |
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